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“It isn’t exactly pretty — and certainly isn’t tidy — but peace really does appear to be breaking out in the Middle East.”
“One gets the feeling that if the progress could hold up for just a touch longer, not only would there be an Israeli-Syrian deal and a U.S.-Iranian understanding, the world itself would change. Those of us here who are old enough to remember haven’t sensed such a fateful moment since the weeks before the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989.”
Avni Doğru describes Turkey’s quiet involvement all over the region quite well:
Turkey has been playing a key mediating role in several conflicts, including those between Syria and Israel, between Palestine and Israel, and in Lebanon. Syria and Israel just had their third round of indirect talks under Turkey’s mediation in Istanbul. Similarly, the Ankara Forum had several meetings so far and brought the private sectors of Israel and Palestine together to work on possible rapprochement. The Ankara Forum also hosted a meeting between the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli President Shimon Peres before the Annapolis summit in November 2007. After the 2006 Lebanon war, the AKP government decided to send 1,000 troops – one of the largest contributions – to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon despite harsh domestic opposition. Also, during the recent Lebanon crisis in May 2008, Turkey played the mediator role between the Shia opposition and the Sunni establishment thanks to its good relations with both parties. Its balanced policy toward each group also secured Turkey an active role in bridging the Sunni-Shia divide in Iraq in 2007. It has similarly worked behind the scenes in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan on peace-building efforts. In fact, Turkey is now the only country that enjoys good relations with every country in the Middle East.
However, there is one major complication. Although Erdoğan’s government is playing an increasingly crucial international role, his domestic house is in disorder. On Monday, Turkey’s Constitutional Court will begin final deliberations on whether or not to disband the AK party for anti-secular activities. It is almost certain that they will shut down the party and ban its leaders from politics.
Staunch secularists, including the military, many judges, and Turkey’s elite Kemalist establishment, see AK’s brand of Islamism as a creeping threat to Turkey’s long-established secular order, and AK’s leaders as agents of a plot to impose sharia law on the Turkish Republic. The truth is more complicated.
There is no doubt that AK is an Islamist party. Their political strength comes both from a “silent majority” voter base of conservative and religious Turks, especially outside Turkey’s urban centers, and a spectacular track record of economic growth. The party was formed by a faction of politicians from the Welfare Party, itself banned as anti-secular in 1998. And although the leaders of AK have done much for liberalism in Turkey — abolished the death penalty, promoted legal equality, opened the economy and tamed inflation — they have also done their share of dumb, illiberal things, including a 2004 attempt to criminalize adultery, local bans and regulation on alcohol consumption, a crackdown on pork butchers and pig farms, and a famous attempt to lift the prohibition on headscarves at university. All these policies are rooted in conservative, traditional belief, and few of them have been reported by those in the West with a simple view of the troubles. AK have also been keen practitioners of kadrolaşma, the Turkish tradition of stuffing bureaucracies and government offices full of sympathetic appointees. But none of their actions are a threat to secularism or democracy any more than, say, the Bush administration’s attempts to push abstinence-only sex ed and appoint Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court threatened the American way. The argument against AK is reductio ad sharium.
The secularists are also more complex. Although often portrayed simply as a “hard-line Kemalist elite” out of touch with the wishes of the people, they are more than just military brass eager for an antidemocratic coup. Historically, the military, which sees itself as part of a long tradition started by Atatürk, himself a military commander, has been an important defender of secularism. Past coups have been no victory for democracy, but they have established crucial “red lines” for Turkish civil society and helped stabilize the political arena by preventing the undue influence of both statist and Islamic extremists. However, their time has passed, and the generals ought to recognize rule of law as the real protector of the secular state.
Last time his party was challenged, during protests over the headscarf ban, Erdoğan called a snap election that handed AK a renewed mandate and a bigger share of parliament. Whether he will do so again remains to be seen. A snap election before the ruling would not be a surprise. However, over the course of their second term in power, AK has lost some support in the Kurdish southeast by allowing the military to crack down on the PKK. AK also faces a vocal, mobilized secular opposition. Considering this, a preemptive election would be a strategic mistake. A post-ban election would be more prudent, since the court ruling will solidify the party base. Rebuliding after a ban is also a well-established process in Turkish politics: If banned, AK’s representatives will stand for election as independents, preserve their majority, and form up as a new party with a different name. Although their leaders will ostensibly be banned from politics for five years, it would be a victory for secularism in name only, leaving the most extreme secularists “stuck between a coup and a hard place,” as one diplomat recently told The Economist.
However, the turmoil caused by a party ban would throw the government into disarray for a bit, and the hassle of forming a new party and parliamentary coalition would certainly put a halt to the negotiations sponsored Erdoğan’s government and close the window of opportunity for an international agreement. If the potential for a broad Mideast peace negotiated via Turkey is true, an AK ban will be a very bad thing.
U.S. officials are hesitant to comment on the ban for fear of alienating the Turkish military, the institution where our strategic interests currently lie. As long as a quarter of the fuel consumed by coalition forces in Iraq enters through the Habur gate, and 70 percent of air cargo is flown in from the U.S. air force base in Incırlık, this will probably remain the case. However, next week will be a crucial time, not just for the future of democracy and secularism in Turkey, but for the prospects of peace in the Middle East. Losing AK means losing the crucial peace negotiations they are helping to mediate, which mean losing our last best hope for a grand agreement. We can only hope someone in our government finds the courage to speak up.
